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Abstract 
The reduction of green house gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, 
especially in tropical countries, is a necessary action for the mitigation of global climate 
change. Guyana is one of few countries which maintain a high forest cover (85%) and a 
low rate of deforestation (<0.1%). Guyana has articulated a Low Carbon Development 
Strategy (LCDS) by which it intends to maintain the climate regulation services 
provided by its forest and receive REDD+ payments. Increased deforestation, primarily 
form alluvial gold mining, however threatens success of the LCDS. 
This master’s project reviews the regulatory and policy environment for forest 
management in Guyana and utilizes experiences of the management of a conservation 
concession in the upper Essequibo River.  The study analyzes benefits and costs of 
management of the conservation concession under the conditions of its establishment 
and three alternative scenarios. Recommendations are provided for the enabling of 
conservation concessions in the context of the LCDS. 
The study recommends enacting regulatory conditions to limit deforestation, 
establishing means to mitigate and offset deforestation, and enabling optimal value 
flows for conservation concession management.  
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Introduction 
Guyana is a small country of approximately 215,000 square kilometers on the northern 
coast of South America. The country’s population is approximately 750,000 people most 
of whom live on the narrow strip along the Atlantic coast (Beaie, 2007). The economy of 
the country is primarily based on agriculture, and extractive activities such as logging 
and mining. Guyana has maintained almost all of its lands and ecosystems in an intact 
state with more than 90% of the country covered with natural ecosystems – mainly 
forest, savannahs and wetlands.  Intact forests cover approximately 85% of the country 
(GFC, 2012a), most of which contain species with commercial timber value. 
Despite relying on extractive activities for economic development, Guyana is one of 
only a few countries which maintain a high percentage of its original forest cover and 
continue to lose forest very slowly (da Fonseca et al., 2007). The annual rate of 
deforestation between 1990 and 2012 has been maintained between 0.010% and 0.079% 
(GFC, 2011a, 2012b, 2013). The country is however challenged to maintain this low rate 
of deforestation as it seeks to secure economic development at a much faster pace.  This 
challenge is made even more difficult with high global market prices for minerals, gold 
in particular (CI-Guyana, WWF-Guianas, & Projekt-Consult GmbH, 2013). 
Global Climate Change and Guyana’s Forests 
Global climate change, driven by increased emission of green house gases -- primarily 
carbon dioxide (CO2) -- from anthropogenic sources, is among the greatest challenges 
facing civilization today.  Studies suggest that between 12% and 17% of anthropogenic 
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CO2 emission results from deforestation primarily in tropical countries (IPCC, 2007; van 
der Werf et al., 2009). Deforestation also reduces the natural sinks which remove CO2 
from the atmosphere, exacerbating the change. It is estimated that Guyana’s 18.5 million 
hectares of forests (GFC, 2013) stores the equivalent of about five gigatons of CO2 in its 
above ground biomass (GFC, 2012a). This stock is equal to about 15% of the total global 
green house gas emissions from all sources in 2011 (Olivier, Janssens-Maehout, & 
Peters, 2012). 
Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation is recognized as one of the means by 
which global climate change can be addressed. Discussions within the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are gearing towards 
establishment of a program for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation with conservation and sustainable forest management (REDD+). REDD+, 
if fully implemented by the UNFCCC, will allow for developing countries to be 
compensated for reduced CO2 emissions achieved by reduction or avoidance of 
deforestation and forest degradation. Compensation could be through 
intergovernmental transfers or through payments linked to trading of carbon credits. 
In 2009 Guyana articulated a strategy to transform its economy along a low-carbon 
trajectory while combating global climate change (OP, 2013). The Low-Carbon 
Development Strategy (LCDS) seeks to ensure maintenance of the global climate 
regulation services provided by Guyana’s forest in return for payments to drive further 
investments in a low-carbon economy. These payments are expected to be realized 
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through agreements for REDD+; essentially for avoiding the emission of carbon stored 
within Guyana’s forests as the country develops (OP, 2013). The Kingdom of Norway 
has pledged support for the LCDS and has agreed to pay Guyana up to a total of two 
hundred and fifty million United States dollars (US$250 Million) over a five year period 
ending in 2015 (Guyana & Norway, 2012). 
The success of the LCDS is therefore dependent on the country finding ways to realize 
economic development that avoids extensive deforestation. Among the measures being 
implemented are the establishment and management of a national system of protected 
areas, and enhanced integration in the management of natural resource extraction (OP, 
2013). Increased interest in extraction, particularly in mining and forestry, however 
threatens the success of these measures as deforestation continues to rise (GFC, 2011a, 
2012b, 2013). 
It is therefore an imperative that measures to reduce the impacts of the extractive 
activities which drive deforestation be implemented. These measures must however not 
adversely affect the country economically or socially. The incentivizing of forest 
conservation actions can be one of the most effective means available to realize the 
maintenance of a low deforestation rate. 
Conservation Concessions 
Direct payment for conservation has been effectively used, particularly in the United 
States, for more than half a century. Conservation easements are agreements, mostly 
between private land owners and conservation organizations, in which land owners 
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agree to conserve particular features or avoid certain types of development in exchange 
for payment or other incentives. In most conservation easements, possession and 
management of the land remains with the owner (The Nature Conservancy, 2014).  
Conservation concessions are easement type agreements between owners of forest 
resources, most times the State, and concessionaires (resource managers) for the 
maintenance of ecosystems and biodiversity through avoidance of logging. The 
concessionaire assumes management of the forested lands and provides payments to 
the resource owners comparable to what might be earned through extractive uses (Rice, 
2002). The concept, introduced by Conservation International (CI), aims to enable 
biodiversity conservation and protection to much better compete with extraction and 
conversion. It complements a suite of similar concepts which aim to provide incentives 
for conservation especially in developing countries with heavy reliance on exploitation 
for economic development (Rice, 2002).  
The first conservation concession agreement was established in Peru in 2001 for 130,000 
hectares of the forested Peruvian Amazon (Ellison, 2003; Hardner & Rice, 2002; Rice, 
2002). Peru had only a few months prior amended its forestry laws to specifically allow 
entities to bid for concessions for biodiversity conservation in the same way that 
logging companies bid for forest concessions (Ellison, 2003; Hardner & Rice, 2002).  
In 2002, the Upper Essequibo Conservation Concession (UECC) was established 
through an agreement between Conservation International Guyana (CI-Guyana) and 
the Guyana Forestry Commission (GFC) to lease an area of 82,199 hectares of intact 
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forest for thirty years (CI-Guyana, 2013; Ellison, 2003; GFC, 2002). The UECC was 
primarily established to realize biodiversity conservation within Guyana’s policy 
environment which favored extraction (CI-Guyana, 2002, 2007, 2013; Ellison, 2003). CI-
Guyana managed the UECC for ten years before ending the concession agreement 
prematurely (CI-Guyana, 2013). 
Unlike the concession in Peru, the UECC was established under laws which made no 
specific provisions for conservation leases (CI-Guyana, 2013). However, Guyana’s 
statutory and other provisions for forest management have since changed significantly 
embracing forest conservation as a central pillar ("Forest Act," 2009; GFC, 2012a; OP, 
2013). Revised forestry legislation, allowing conservation concessions in Guyana, was 
passed in 2009 ("Forest Act," 2009).   
Conservation concessions can serve beyond biodiversity conservation to play a pivotal 
role in the success of the LCDS. They can be key tools to deliver zero deforestation in 
portions of Guyana’s forest estate to compensate for higher deforestation rates 
associated with extraction (CI-Guyana, 2013). Conservation concessions can enable 
Guyana to couple extraction with conservation to realize optimum management of 
deforestation, and enable success of REDD+ and the LCDS.  
CI’s experience in managing the UECC suggests that the relationship between costs 
borne and benefits enjoyed by key stakeholders is a key determinant of success (CI-
Guyana, 2013). 
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Study Aim 
This study utilizes the experience of managing the UECC from 2002 to 2012 to analyze 
economic costs and benefits of management of the site. These analyses of benefits and 
costs together with review of the legislative and regulatory policy framework for forest 
management in Guyana provide the basis for recommendations for the creation of 
enabling conditions for the realization of the potential of conservation concessions. The 
study examines the benefit-cost relationships under alternative regulatory conditions 
with and without REDD+, and logging follow sustainable forest management (SFM) 
guidelines. 
Forest Management and the LCDS 
Over the course of its recent history, Guyana has relied mainly on extraction of timber 
and minerals from the country’s vast forests, and agriculture on the Atlantic coast for 
economic growth. In recent years, with high world prices for gold, mining has become 
the largest production activity in the country, accounting for 8.6% of the total gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2012 and 23% of GDP when the contribution of services are 
not considered (Statistics, 2013). Forestry’s contribution to GDP has decreased in recent 
years, from US$54.79 million (10% of non-service GDP) in 2006 to US$44.43 million (7% 
of non-service GDP) in 2012. Forestry production was projected to decrease further to 
US$41.94 million (6% of non-service GDP) in 2013 (Statistics, 2013). 
Lands in Guyana are either public, private or community owned; the vast majority are 
publicly owned and managed by the State. Private lands are mostly small residential 
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holdings primarily on the coast where most of the population exists. Amerindians – 
indigenous Guyanese – currently own and manage approximately 14% of the country’s 
landmass through communal land titles (GLSC, 2013). 
Public lands and the resources they contain are managed in a piecemeal manner by 
several State agencies mainly for forestry, mineral and agriculture production, and 
protection and conservation (GLSC, 2013). Twelve million eight hundred thousand 
hectares of the forested public lands are designated the State Forest Estate and 
administered mainly for forestry production and conservation through the GFC (GFC, 
2011b).  
The GFC is responsible for advising on forest policy, establishing and implementing 
standards for the sector, implementing forest protection and conservation, overseeing 
forest research, and providing guidance to capacity building for the sector (GFC, 2008). 
The Commission is also the focal point for Guyana’s efforts towards the establishment 
of a national program for REDD+ (GFC, 2012a).  
LCDS, REDD+ and Agreement with Norway 
In 2009, Guyana became one of the first countries to present a national strategy to 
transform its economy in a manner that avoids the deforestation that can result from 
rational forest uses for development. The LCDS essentially commits Guyana to 
managing its forests in a manner that keeps the rate of deforestation low. The country 
expects to receive REDD+ payments for the climate benefits provided by its actions (OP, 
2013).  
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Guyana is at the forefront of REDD+ globally having taken several innovative steps 
towards shaping how countries with high forest cover and low rates of deforestation 
can contribute to addressing carbon emission and climate change. A Readiness 
Preparation Proposal (RPP) outlining plans for REDD+ at the national level has been 
submitted to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank (GFC, 2012a); a 
system for the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions from deforestation is 
in place (GFC, 2011a, 2012b, 2013); methods are being explored for the establishment of 
a reference level for future emissions against which performance would be better 
measured (GFC, 2013); and a mechanism for the receipt and administration of payments 
has been established – the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF) (GRIF, 2012b; OP, 
2013). 
Guyana’s advanced state of readiness for REDD+ has been bolstered mainly by an 
agreement with the Kingdom of Norway.  The agreement provides Guyana with the 
opportunity to earn up to US$250 million over five years to 2015 for the climate services 
provided by keeping its deforestation below an agreed threshold (Guyana & Norway, 
2012). Guyana has up to the end of 2012 received three payments totaling US$115 
million under the agreement (GRIF, 2012a) and a fourth payment is being determined 
on performance for 2012. 
Under the agreement with Norway, Guyana is eligible for payments calculated at US$5 
per ton CO2 emission avoidance. The emission avoidance is calculated by firstly 
determining the amount of avoided deforestation then converting this using an interim 
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factor of 367 ton CO2 per hectare (100 ton Carbon per hectare) deforestation. The 
deforestation avoided is established by determining the difference between the actual 
measured deforestation in a period and an interim reference level set at 0.275%. The 
reference level was established using a combined reference level methodology based on 
equal weighting of the mean historic baseline annual deforestation rate in Guyana 
between 2000 and 2009 (0.03%) and the mean annual deforestation rate in developing 
countries with deforestation from 2005 to 2009 (0.52%) (Guyana & Norway, 2012).   
With the large gap between Guyana’s deforestation rate in 2009 and the agreed 
reference level, it was agreed that Guyana will receive reduced payments for units of 
deforestation above 0.056%. No payment is made for years that deforestation reaches or 
exceeds 0.1%. This is intended to discourage continuation of business as usual in forest 
management while recognizing the need for some development activities which will 
result in deforestation (Guyana & Norway, 2012). Essentially, Guyana has committed 
that, while it can rationally increase its deforestation rate to 0.275% annually, ideally its 
future annual deforestation with a low-carbon economy will remain at or below 0.056% 
and never rise above 0.1%. This is equivalent to between 10,353 and 18,488 hectares of 
deforestation per year at the current forest cover (GFC, 2013). 
Drivers of Deforestation in Guyana  
Using advanced remote sensing and other technologies, and an increasing level of 
verification on the ground, the GFC has been tracking changes in Guyana’s forest cover 
in recent years. Three assessments have been completed covering 1990 to 2012 (GFC, 
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2011a, 2012b, 2013) and an assessment for 2013 is currently due. Through these 
assessments, it has been determined that activities associated with mining – mainly 
small-scale alluvial gold mining – are the leading drivers of deforestation in Guyana. 
Mining was responsible for 93% of the total deforestation in 2012, and contributed 
similar portions in the two years prior (Figure 1) (GFC, 2011a, 2012b, 2013). This 
increase is closely associated with increased activity in the sector fueled by high world 
prices for gold (CI-Guyana et al., 2013). 
Figure 1: Graph showing annualized deforestation in Guyana by drivers between 1990 and 
2012. Source (GFC, 2011a, 2012b, 2013). 
 
The importance of mining to Guyana’s development extends beyond economics to 
include socio-cultural issues and thus is an extremely important aspect of the nation. 
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Guyana’s mining sector is made up of primarily small and medium scale gold mines 
operated mostly on personal investments (CI-Guyana et al., 2013). The mining sector is 
also the main source of employment for a large number of persons (Thomas, 2009). 
Efforts are being made, though currently with little impact, to improve the performance 
of the sector with regards to deforestation and other environmental and social impacts. 
These measures include improving monitoring and enforcement capacity, enhancing 
integration of mining and forestry planning and management, and improving site 
reclamation and after use (PSC, CI-Guyana, & WWF-Guianas, 2013). 
The deforestation limits committed to by Guyana has established a deforestation budget 
for the country (CI-Guyana, 2013). The country must effectively manage this budget to 
maximize the returns on its investment. Current activities which result in deforestation, 
such as mining, must become more efficient in terms of the unit production per unit of 
deforestation and degradation created.  Additionally, a suite of new economically 
beneficial forest uses that result in little or no deforestation must be encouraged. 
Conservation concessions within the State Forest Estate can be one such use. 
With Guyana’s changed policy environment, it is necessary to reform the model of 
conservation concessions implemented in the country for effectiveness. A reformed 
model must take the realities of REDD+ and the LCDS into account. Assessment of the 
experience managing the UECC is an appropriate point from which this reform should 
commence. 
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Policy Review 
Article 36 of the Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana (1980) outlines 
the commitment of the State to sustainable development and environmental protection. 
The LCDS sets the overarching framework for the management of Guyana’s forests, 
committing to the maintenance of low levels of deforestation (OP, 2013). The LCDS 
however does not establish legislation to regulate deforestation by forest users.  
Management of the State Forest is primarily legislated by the Forest Act of 2009 and 
effected through the GFC ("Forest Act," 2009). Guyana’s forest policy is further 
articulated within a National Forest Policy Statement (GFC, 2011b). Forest management 
is also influenced by laws governing the establishment and management of Amerindian 
village lands ("Amerindian Act," 2006); the leasing and management of lands for mining 
("Mining Act," 1989); and environmental management ("Environmental Protection Act," 
1996). 
Forest Act of 2009 
Unlike the Forest Act (1953), the Forest Act (2009) includes specific provisions for the 
issuing of leases to portions of the state forest estate for forest conservation. The Forest 
Act (2009) defines “forest conservation operations” to include: “the preservation of 
forests for the purpose of carbon sequestration or any other form of environmental 
services; the conservation of biological diversity; and eco-tourism” (section 2).  
Sub-section (2)(c) of Section 6 of the Forest Act (2009) makes provisions for the 
Commissioner of Forests to grant concessions for the conduct of forest conservation 
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operations after consideration of applications. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 allows for 
such concessions to be granted “even if forest produce suitable for commercial use 
occurs in the area”("Forest Act," 2009, section 6(3)). 
Section 8 of the Forest Act of 2009 lays out conditions for the granting or renewal of 
concessions larger than 8,097 hectares. Sub-section (1)(b) of this section allows for 
persons, which it defines to include local and international non-governmental 
organizations, who satisfy requirements for the right to carry out forest conservation 
operation, to be granted concessions for this purpose ("Forest Act," 2009, section 8 
(1)(b)).  
Under the new legislation, an exploratory permit is not required for granting of 
concessions for conservation. Exploratory permits are prerequisite for logging 
concessions and granted for up to three-years ("Forest Act," 2009).  
Operations within the State Forest Estate, for both conservation and extraction, must be 
carried out in accordance with an approved management plan covering at least five 
years of operation. The law also makes provisions for the preparation of annual 
operational plans ("Forest Act," 2009).  
Payment of a security bond is required according to Section 13. This bond is required in 
lieu of any future fees, penalties and other charges. Section 13 also provides for waiver 
of the bond in cases after public notification and engagement on the reasons for the 
waiver ("Forest Act," 2009). 
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The Act empowers the GFC to prepare codes of practice to regulate activities in all types 
of forest concessions. These codes of practice, once approved, together with the Forest 
Act of 2009 and regulations made under the Act govern activities in the state forest 
estate ("Forest Act," 2009, section 35). 
Section 10 of the Forest Act of 2009 also makes provision for issuing of Annual Use 
Permits for non-extractive occupation of portions of the State Forest Estate. These uses 
include scientific research and ecotourism ("Forest Act," 2009, section 10).  
Part 3 of the Act also provides for collaboration with the Environmental Protection 
Agency to create Specially Protected Areas. Specially protected areas can be created for 
up to 25 years and are designated for the conservation of biodiversity, soil and water 
resources, protection of species, or protection of forests from degradation, fires, pest 
and diseases ("Forest Act," 2009). 
Concessions and other authorizations to the State Forest Estate issued under the forest 
Act (2009) do not confer exclusive rights of occupation and use unless explicitly stated 
in the authorization. The Act however does protect against issuance of multiple 
authorizations for any forest resource in an area ("Forest Act," 2009, section 14). It is 
therefore possible that multiple authorizations can be issued to an area for different 
forest and other resources, by different agencies. This presents challenges in the 
management of forestry resources as clearance of forest is required in order to access 
some resources such as minerals.  
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Other Relevant Land use Legislation 
The Mining Act of 1989 establishes that “all minerals within the lands of Guyana shall 
vest in the state” (section 6). This Act further confers upon a commission – Guyana 
Geology and Mines Commission – powers to grant licenses or permits “to enter on State 
lands and there search or mine for, take and appropriate, minerals” ("Mining Act," 1989, 
section 7 (3)).  Section 9 of the Mining Act of 1989 further limits the rights to mineral 
resources through other grants to State lands issued after 1903. 
Section 13 (2) of the Amerindian Act of 2006 establishes that “[a] Village Council may 
assign tasks but may not delegate its functions to any other person.” Establishing that 
villages, through their village councils, are the only entities with the power to manage 
lands titled to them. Part V of the Act however outlines the roles of national resource 
management agencies in assisting villages in managing mineral and forest resources on 
village lands. This section of the Act establishes that the GFC has responsibility of 
monitoring forest operations by non-residents permitted by the village on village lands 
("Amerindian Act," 2006, part V).  
National Forest Policy Statement 
Currently, activities of the GFC are guided by the National Forest Policy Statement 
promulgated in 2011(GFC, 2011b). This statement replaced a similar piece articulated in 
1997 (GFC, 1997) and places management of Guyana’s forests within the context of the 
LCDS and REDD+ initiatives. The 2011 policy statement outlines the need for integrated 
land use planning and the implementation of strategies for the resolution of land use 
conflicts in the context of sustainable management of Guyana’s forests.  Efforts at 
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conserving Guyana’s forests, including the addition of conservation concessions as a 
category of forest allocation, are also outlined in the statement (GFC, 2011b). 
The statement sets out that, “the overall objective of the National Forest Policy is the 
conservation, protection, management and utilization of the nation’s forest resources, 
while ensuring that the productive capacity of the forests for both goods and services is 
maintained or enhanced”(GFC, 2011b, p. 16). Four specific objectives are outlined in the 
statement to:  
(a) promote the sustainable and efficient forest activities which utilise the 
broad range of forest resources and contribute to national development 
while allowing fair returns to local and foreign entrepreneurs and 
investors;  
(b) achieve improved sustainable forest resource yields while ensuring the 
conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity, and the environment;  
(c) ensure watershed protection and rehabilitation: prevent and arrest the 
erosion of soils and the degradation of forests, grazing lands, soil and 
water; promote natural regeneration, afforestation and reforestation; and 
protect the forest against fire, pests and other hazards; and  
(d) identify and quantify environmental services to generate forest 
incentives for national development. (GFC, 2011b, p. 16)  
The Upper Essequibo Conservation Concession Experience 
In 2002, management of Guyana’s State Forest Estate was legislated by the Forest Act of 
1953  which made no provision for the issuance of conservation concessions ("Forest 
Act," 1953). At the time, policies regarding forest management, though referring to the 
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importance of forest conservation, addressed economic benefits of the forest exclusively 
from resource extraction (GFC, 1997). International interests in Guyana’s forest 
resources were growing bolstering the view of the possible economic benefits of forest 
exploitation.  Barama Company Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of a Malaysian 
conglomerate, had just over a decade earlier been granted a 1.6 million hectare 
concession in the northwest of the country (Barama Company Limited, 2013a, 2013b).         
Faced with the challenge of securing long-term protection of Guyana’s rich biodiversity 
in this economic policy environment, CI proposed the innovative concept of 
conservation concessions to the Government of Guyana (CI-Guyana, 2013; Rice, 2002). 
CI essentially offered to provide the State, and other stakeholders, revenues and other 
benefits comparable to those possible from logging to maintain the timber stock of an 
area of the State Forest Estate (CI-Guyana, 2013; Ellison, 2003; Rice, 2002).  
The GFC leased CI-Guyana 82,199 hectares in the upper Essequibo River region 
through a Timber Sale Agreement (TSA) – the only legal means available at the time – 
in 2002 (CI-Guyana, 2013; GFC, 2002). CI-Guyana managed the UECC for ten of the 
thirty year of the lease and ended the agreement in 2012 (CI-Guyana, 2013). The site has 
not yet been reallocated; stakeholder communities have indicated to government their 
interest in ensuring the continuation of conservation management at the site.   
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Site Description 
The UECC was located in the upper reaches of the Essequibo River – Guyana’s largest 
river. The concession occupied densely forested road-less lands with the Essequibo 
River flowing through the site (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Map showing the location of the UECC and stakeholder communities. Source (CI-
Guyana, 2013). 
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Three communities were associated with the site based on their proximity and 
connection to the site. The Amerindian communities of Apoteri, Rewa and Crash Water 
are approximately 80, 115 and 160 kilometers away from the site by river, respectively 
(CI-Guyana, 2013). Current human use of the site is limited to occasional balata latex 
extraction and fishing by Amerindian communities closest to the site (CI-Guyana, 2002, 
2007). Evidence of historical occupation has also been recorded (Simon, 2007). 
The site of the UECC houses portions of the rich biodiversity of the Guiana Shield. 
Healthy populations of fish (Willink, Alexander, & Jones, 2013), primates and other 
mammals, and a diversity of plants can be found at the site (CI-Guyana, 2013). The 
forests of the site are mostly mixed forests with probably the most southern stand of the 
endemic and economically important Greenheart trees (Chlorocardium rodiei) (CI-
Guyana, 2013). Twenty-one other commercial timber species have been recorded at the 
site. The densities of the commercial species recorded at the site are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Density of commercial timber species in the UECC (GFC, 2006). 
Species Density 
(m3/ha) 
Special Category 
Bulletwood 0.18 
Greenheart 5.23 
Class 1 
Crabwood 0.10 
Kabukalli 0.57 
Locust 0.07 
Mora 1.95 
Morabukea 0.44 
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Shibadan 0.12 
Simarupa 0.16 
Suya 0.34 
Ulu 0.08 
Wamara 0.34 
Class 2 
Baromalli 0.92 
Dukali 0.25 
Kereti Silverballi 0.01 
Manni 0.07 
Monkey Pot 0.07 
Wallaba 0.37 
Class 3 
Fukadi (Coffee Mortar) 0.07 
Haiariballi 0.24 
Kakaralli 0.40 
Maho 0.18 
   
The forests of the site also provide fresh water, carbon storage and other ecosystem 
services. 
Establishing the UECC   
Application for issuing of the UECC followed the established process for the acquisition 
of a lease for logging as laid out in the Forest Act of 1953 and regulations in force at the 
time. This was the only means available under existing laws to lease land within the 
State Forest Estate and required that CI-Guyana pay an application fee of US$20,000. 
Firstly, in 2001, CI-Gguyana acquired a State Forest Exploratory Permit (SFEP) to the 
site from the GFC (CI-Guyana, 2013; Hardner & Rice, 2002). Under the SFEP, CI-
Guyana conducted a series of studies including a Social Impact Assessment and a 
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timber inventory, and prepared a management plan for site for approval by GFC (CI-
Guyana, 2013).  
Following approval of the management plan for the UECC, CI-Guyana made an 
application for a TSA as required by the laws in force at the time. The TSA for the 
UECC was similar to those issued for concessions for logging except that CI-Guyana 
was expected to ensure the conservation and management of the biodiversity at the site 
(CI-Guyana, 2013; GFC, 2002). 
The Concession Agreement 
The terms of the agreement for the UECC were similar to those for logging concessions. 
The agreement stipulated that CI-Guyana undertakes activities required of logging 
concessionaires including demarcation, signage, preparation of a management plan, 
and maintenance of records of forest resources taken from and operations carried out at 
the site (GFC, 2002).  
The terms of the agreement also required payment of fees and other charges paid by 
loggers including a negotiated minimum annual royalty fee of US$11,000 (GFC, 2002). 
Though no logging was to take place at the site, payment of royalty was required to 
ensure the provision of comparable benefits to the state.   
The agreement restricted activities to those approved in the management plan for the 
site but made no direct reference to biodiversity conservation (GFC, 2002). It required 
that management of the site be in accordance with the Environmental Protection Act 
1996 which requires, among other things, environmental authorization for logging 
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operations ("Environmental Protection Act," 1996). The approved management plans for 
the UECC established biodiversity conservation objectives for management of the site 
(CI-Guyana, 2002, 2007). 
UECC Management 
The management objective of the UECC was to “maintain the biological diversity that is 
present in the concession, which includes the diversity of ecosystems and processes, of 
biological communities, and of plant and animal species” (CI-Guyana, 2002, 2007). The 
achievement of this objective was supported by four sub-objectives focused on the 
generation and sharing of knowledge on the biological and cultural values of the site; 
mitigation of adverse impacts to these values; generation of significant benefits to local 
communities and nationally; and promotion of the values and benefits of management 
of the site (CI-Guyana, 2002, 2007). 
Administratively, the concession was managed through established CI-Guyana offices 
in Georgetown (Guyana’s capital city) and Lethem (a township on the border with 
Brazil). An operational base was also established in Apoteri Village, the community 
closest to the concession site (CI-Guyana, 2002, 2007, 2013). 
Staffing included four dedicated Conservation Officers chosen from two of the three 
stakeholder communities (CI-Guyana, 2002, 2007). The officers were trained, with CI-
Guyana’s support, through a recognized park ranger training program. The 
Conservation Officers provided day to day management of the concession and reported 
to a designated manager within CI-Guyana (CI-Guyana, 2002, 2007, 2013). In the early 
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years of management of the UECC, a dedicated Concession Manager was hired and 
located at the Apoteri base to oversee implementation of activities at the site (CI-
Guyana, 2002, 2013). The wider CI-Guyana staff provided support for the management 
of the site. 
The VCIF 
CI-Guyana established a Voluntary Community Investment Fund (VCIF) as part of its 
efforts to alleviate potential negative social impacts of the management of the site for 
conservation rather than timber extraction, and maintain connection between the site 
and communities (CI-Guyana, 2013). The fund provided up to US$10,000 annually to 
support projects in the three stakeholder communities. The VCIF projects were 
intended to improve the standards of living in the communities, support growth of 
sustainable enterprises, enhance community project management capacities, and 
empower community residents. The fund, though successful to some extent, exhibited 
shortcomings in its design, governance, implementation and impact, especially in the 
early years (McIntosh, 2009).  
Projects totaling US$82,520 were supported by the VCIF (CI-Guyana, 2014). These 
projects spanned areas such as the provision of equipment, infrastructure improvement, 
enterprise development and capacity building (CI-Guyana, 2013).  More details on the 
projects supported by the VCIF can be found in Appendix 1.  
Stakeholder Involvement and Impacts 
A large number of stakeholders were involved in the planning, establishment and 
management of the UECC. These entities and their roles changed as the project 
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progressed from stage to stage. Comparatively larger numbers of stakeholders were 
involved in the planning phase of the site as compared to the site operation phase (CI-
Guyana, 2013). The planning phase included consultations with the local communities, 
community-based organizations, international organizations, government agencies, 
academic institutions, political parties, international development partners, the private 
sector, and indigenous advocacy groups. Much of the interaction with stakeholders at 
this stage was realized through regional and national advisory groups (CI-Guyana, 
2002). 
CI-Guyana identified six groups of stakeholders as being important to the 
implementation of a conservation concession in Guyana based on its experience 
managing the UECC. These are Resource Owners, Resource Managers, Resource Users, 
Investors, Conservation Business and Neighbors (CI-Guyana, 2013). One entity may, in 
cases, fulfill more than one stakeholder role in a conservation concession.  For example, 
it is possible that a Resource Manager can also be an Investor and/or a Conservation 
Business. The generalized relationships between the various stakeholders are shown in 
Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: Generalized relationship of stakeholders in conservation concessions in Guyana. Source 
(CI-Guyana, 2013). 
 
Resource Owners are the entities which have legal ownership of the area within which 
the conservation concession is located. In the case of a conservation concession in the 
State Forest Estate, such as the UECC, the State is the sole Resource Owner. 
Resource Managers performs management of the assets of a conservation concession 
through agreement with the Resource Owner(s). CI-Guyana was the Resource Manager 
in the case of the UECC. 
Resource Users are entities with legal or customary rights to use the assets of the 
concession. The communities of Apoteri, Rewa and Crash Water fell into this category 
in relation to the UECC. 
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Investors provide financing for the management of the site. Their return can be either 
financial or other gains, such as mission fulfillment. Investors may participate 
voluntarily in conservation concessions, as in the case of philanthropic donors. Legal 
requirement, such as those requiring project proponents to mitigate or compensate 
impacts through offsets, can also compel investment in conservation concessions. All 
investors to the UECC were voluntary and included mainly the Global Conservation 
Fund, and Save Your World – a US company which sold rainforest-based personal care 
products. 
 Conservation Businesses are enterprises which offer for sale good or services derived 
from the conservation concession such as tourism and ecosystem services. No 
conservation business was associated with the UECC. 
Neighbors are owners or managers of lands adjacent to the conservation concession. In 
2008, SFEPs were issued for two sites surrounding the UECC.  
Each of the stakeholders in the implementation of the conservation concession bears 
some costs and receives benefits. CI-Guyana (2013) posits that the benefit-cost 
relationship, both in quantum and quality, for each stakeholder is a key determinant in 
the success of the management of the site. For success, the following four conditions 
must be met (CI-Guyana, 2013). 
i. Benefit-cost relationship for Resource Owner(s) should be no less favorable than 
feasible alternative uses of the site. 
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ii. Benefits and cost to the Resource Manager must be at least equal or benefits must 
outweigh costs. 
iii. Benefits must outweigh costs for Resource Users and Investors. 
iv. Costs to Neighbors should not exceed benefits they receive. (CI-Guyana, 2013, p. 
26) 
Financing 
CI-Guyana reports a total expenditure of US$1,252,122 over the ten years of 
management of the UECC. Thirty three percent of these costs were related to fees and 
royalties paid to the State through the GFC and the Guyana Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA); 7% for VCIF projects in the communities; 2% for other projects in the 
area; and 59% for the management of the site inclusive of administration, capacity 
building and research (CI-Guyana, 2013, 2014). Annual expenditure by CI-Guyana for 
the UECC over the ten years of management by cost categories is shown in Figure 4 
below. 
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Figure 4: Annual expenditure by CI-Guyana for UECC from 2002 to 2012 (CI-Guyana, 2014). 
 
Management cost as a percentage of total costs was highly variable over the first half of 
the period but showed a steady decline over the latter half. This is attributed to costs of 
several studies, training of the Conservation Officers and other expenses which were 
covered in the beginning of management of the site. Deliberate efforts were made to 
bring the cost of management of the site down beginning in 2008.   
Fees paid by CI-Guyana included an annual acreage fee and royalty payments as 
required under the TSA. Additionally, CI-Guyana paid an annual environmental 
authorization fee, required of logging concessions under the Environmental Protection 
Act 1996. Annual acreage fees were determined at a rate of US$0.37 per hectare of land 
leased. Royalties are paid by logging concessions based on the class and volume of 
timber extracted. Since no timber was to be extracted from the UECC, the minimum 
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royalty payment of US$11,000 annually was established by negotiations (CI-Guyana, 
2013; GFC, 2002). The environmental permitting fee was established at US$500 per year 
(CI-Guyana, 2013). 
Analysis of Costs and Benefits 
Methods and Data 
Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) of the management of the concession was conducted using 
standard BCA methods. The analyses considered ten annual periods commencing in 
July 2002 for comparability with management of the UECC. A 10% discount rate was 
used to compare values in different periods. Emphasis was placed on monetization of 
use values. However, qualitative assessments of costs and benefits were also conducted 
and factored into the results, discussion and recommendations. 
The analysis was conducted from the perspectives of a Resource Manager or 
concessionaire, Resource Owners or the State, and a Resource User – the communities. 
Qualitative assessments of the benefits and costs to other stakeholders were also 
determined and discussed to inform the recommendations presented. 
The Net Present Value (NPV) of management of the UECC site was determined under 
the arrangements of a conservation concession as demonstrated by the UECC and three 
alternative scenarios. The alternatives considered were management of conservation 
concessions under Guyana’s national REDD+ program without requirements to offset 
deforestation impacts of high deforestation activities; inclusion of conservation 
concessions in the national REDD+ program with deforestation offsets; and logging 
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under the REDD+ program. All alternative scenarios assumed commencement of the 
LCDS and agreement with Norway in the first year, and that costs were incurred at the 
end of each period. 
The REDD+ without deforestation offsets scenario assumed contractual arrangements 
for the concession being the same as those for the UECC but the value of the emission 
reduction effected was considered a positive externality of management. This scenario 
considers that Guyana establishes a national-level REDD+ program with no 
mechanisms to transfer benefits of avoiding deforestation from the State to Resource 
Managers and concessionaires. 
The second alternative considered establishment of the conservation concession under a 
national REDD+ program with deforestation offsets required. Under this scenario, all 
concessions to forest lands for forestry, mining or other activities are allowed annual 
deforestation rates of 0.056%. Concessionaires who exceed this level of deforestation are 
required to ensure a net rate within the threshold by compensating those who manage 
their use activities to realize less deforestation than is allowed. Therefore a conservation 
concession realizing net zero deforestation can trade this excess deforestation with a 
miner to allow the miner deforest beyond his allowed limit. The miner would transfer 
some of this additional value as an offset payment. The net effect of this trade will be a 
total deforestation rate of 0.056% between the conservation concession and the mining 
concession. 
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The third alternative considered logging following sustainable forest management 
(SFM) guidelines within the concession with establishment of a national REDD+ 
program committing to a 0.056% deforestation threshold. A deforestation offset 
program was not considered under this scenario, therefore, reduction of emissions from 
deforestation was considered a positive externality. 
It was assumed in all alternative scenarios that (1) under REDD+ 0.056% of every 
hectare of Guyana’s forest can be deforested; and (2) no deforestation results from 
conservation management. 
The sensitivity of the analyses to carbon pricing, deforestation offset payments, timber 
and gold prices, and the discount rate were investigated. 
Benefit and cost data for this study were primarily gathered from CI-Guyana and GFC 
sources. Assumptions supported by literature supplemented data from CI-Guyana and 
the GFC when direct market values were not available. Table 2 shows the benefits and 
costs considered in the study, the sources of data, and means of determining their 
values. 
Table 2: Data sources and methods for monetizing costs and benefits 
Benefits and Costs Methods and Source 
Emission reduction Emission reduction was valued at the price per ton CO2e 
currently set under the agreement between Guyana and 
Norway. It was assumed that this price represents the full 
market value of the emission reduction. Emission reduction 
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Benefits and Costs Methods and Source 
was quantified based on establishing the difference 
between an allowed annual deforestation of 46.03 hectares 
(0.056% of 82,199 hectares) and the deforestation expected 
in the scenario being considered. Deforestation from 
logging in the concession was established by the product of 
the estimated log production from the concession and the 
national production efficiency (hectare deforestation from 
forestry per cubic meter production) for logging 
concessions in each period. Appendix 2c provides details of 
these calculations.  
Deforestation offset 
payments 
Deforestation offset payments represent the revenue to the 
concession from high deforestation uses (mainly mining) 
under scenarios which considered the establishment of the 
offset program. These payments were calculated as 10% of 
the market value of gold that could be produced by the 
same amount of deforestation as the surplus realized in the 
period. Potential gold production was estimated based on 
the gold production efficiency (ounces of gold produced 
per hectare deforestation from mining) in the period. 
Details of the calculation of deforestation offset payments 
are presented in Appendix 3. 
Conservation Grants The investment made by foundations and other donors for 
conservation management of the site was determined from 
CI-Guyana’s records. 
Timber sales Annual sales that could be expected from sustainable 
logging of the concession under a 60-year logging cycle. It 
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Benefits and Costs Methods and Source 
was assumed that log production from the concession 
would contain portions of the various classes of logs as 
recorded by timber inventories at the site. It was also 
assumed that the logging operation is able to take and 
market the same percentage of the annual allowable cut as 
estimated for the rest of the sector. See Appendix 2f for 
more details.   
Economic impact to 
communities 
The benefit of community development and other projects, 
employment for concession management, and the sale of 
goods and services to the concession were determined 
based on the cost to the concessionaire. The scope of this 
study did not allow for incorporation of the recurring 
benefit of returns on capital investments such as improved 
fresh water access and profits from enterprises.  
 
The value of VCIF and other projects supported by the 
UECC, community employment, and sale of goods and 
services from CI-Guyana’s records were used for the 
conservation scenarios. The value under logging 
management was established at 10% of the total 
management cost (2% for community projects and 8% for 
employment). This level was determined from information 
provided by the GFC (Bholanath, 2014a). 
Timber royalties Timber royalty payments to the State by concessionaires 
were estimated following the method currently used in the 
industry, as shown in Appendix 5. It was assumed that log 
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Benefits and Costs Methods and Source 
production from the concession would contain proportions 
of the various classes of logs as documented in the UECC. It 
was also assumed that the concession will yield the same 
percentage of the annual allowable cut as estimated for the 
rest of the sector. See Appendix 1 for more details. 
Concession and other 
fees 
This represents payments made by the concessionaire to the 
State.  It includes application, acreage and environmental 
permitting fees, and in the case of the conservation 
scenarios the minimum royalty payment. Values from CI-
Guyana’s records for the UECC were used for the 
conservation scenarios. For the logging scenario the acreage 
and environmental permitting fee were assumed to be the 
same as for the UECC – US$0.37 per acre and US$500 
respectively. All alternatives considered a required 
application fee of US$20,000 paid prior to the first year. 
Concession Management  The costs of management of the concession by the 
concessionaire, including employment, administration, 
studies, and operating expenses were established from CI-
Guyana’s records for conservation management. For 
logging management, these costs were estimated from 
information provided by the GFC for 2012 – US$98.12 per 
cubic meter production (Bholanath, 2014a) – and the nation 
rate of inflation used to estimate costs for preceding years.  
See Appendix 2g for details.  
Monitoring and This represents costs to the GFC for monitoring and 
regulating concessions. This was estimated at 70% of the 
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Benefits and Costs Methods and Source 
Regulating total expenditure by the GFC in each period (Bholanath, 
2014b). The proportion of this cost which can be attributed 
to the site was estimated based on the product of 
management cost per hectare of land allocated in the period 
and the size of the concession. It was assumed that less 
monitoring and regulation is required under conservation 
management, thus the cost for the conservation scenarios 
was set at 75% of the value for logging concessions. See 
Appendix 4 for details. 
Additional Gold Royalty 
and Taxes 
Additional royalty and taxes to the State from additional 
mining allowed by the surplus deforestation available 
when offsets are considered. Miners pay 8% of the value of 
declarations in royalty and taxes (Alleyne, [Undated]). The 
additional production possible in each period was 
calculated based on the production efficiency (ounces of 
gold produced per hectare deforestation from mining) in 
that period. The value of the production was estimated 
based on the average global market price for gold during 
the period. It was assumed that all production will be 
declared in the period in which it is realized. See Appendix 
3 for details. 
 
Results 
The results of the analysis for all four scenarios are presented below, individually and 
then all together with sensitivity tests. 
~ 36 ~ 
 
Scenario 1: The UECC 
Quantitatively, conservation grants to the concessionaire were identified as the largest 
single benefit, and management costs to the concessionaire the single largest cost of the 
management of the site under the conditions of the agreement for the UECC. 
The NPV of management of the site as a conservation concession under the conditions 
of the UECC agreement was determined to be $157,592 to the Resource Owner; $0 to the 
Resource Manager; and $242,341 to Resource Users at a 10% discount rate. 
Table 3 below shows the total benefit and cost, net benefit and NPV over the periods of 
the assessment for the three stakeholders. More details of the monetized costs and 
benefits under this scenario are presented in Appendix 6. 
 Table 3: Results of BCA at 10% discount rate for (a) Resource Owner, (b) Resource Manager, 
and (c) Resource Users under management as a conservation concession. 
(a) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $          20,000   $             -     $       20,000  
1  $            5,571   $    12,842   $       (7,271) 
2  $          63,992   $    12,842   $       51,150  
3  $          45,422   $    14,414   $       31,008  
4  $          41,474   $    15,736   $       25,738  
5  $          53,190   $    17,444   $       35,746  
6  $          31,230   $    24,061   $         7,169  
7  $          42,496   $    26,482   $       16,014  
8  $          41,515   $    26,203   $       15,312  
9  $          41,669   $    16,384   $       25,285  
10  $          42,000   $    21,200   $       20,800  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $157,592  
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(b) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $          20,000   $          20,000   $                   -    
1  $        145,136   $        145,136   $                   -    
2  $        110,682   $        110,682   $                   -    
3  $        142,062   $        142,062   $                   -    
4  $        134,039   $        134,039   $                   -    
5  $        120,613   $        120,613   $                   -    
6  $        132,114   $        132,114   $                   -    
7  $        157,810   $        157,810   $                   -    
8  $        123,124   $        123,124   $                   -    
9  $        100,590   $        100,590   $                   -    
10  $          85,951   $          85,951   $                   -    
 NPV at 10% discount rate $0  
 
(c) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $                   -     $             -     $                -    
1  $          21,294   $             -     $       21,294  
2  $          22,415   $             -     $       22,415  
3  $          63,586   $             -     $       63,586  
4  $          57,482   $             -     $       57,482  
5  $          43,704   $             -     $       43,704  
6  $          47,332   $             -     $       47,332  
7  $          57,727   $             -     $       57,727  
8  $          36,658   $             -     $       36,658  
9  $          30,345   $             -     $       30,345  
10  $          10,314   $             -     $       10,314  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $242,341  
 
Under the UECC, CI-Guyana also benefited from fulfillment of its mission to effect 
biodiversity conservation in Guyana.  It can be argued also that the UECC helped 
Guyana as a country raise its profile of forest management and biodiversity 
conservation.  
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Benefits to communities also extended beyond those monetized.  Community benefits 
also include the capital benefits that would be carried between periods and the benefits 
of operation of this capital, profits from enterprises for example. Community capacity 
was also improved in many fields including leadership, financial management, and 
project management. 
Though no Conservation Business was operated through the UECC, additional net 
benefits of profits from such businesses can be realized in cases where viable business 
opportunities, such as tourism and research, exist. The major impact of conservation 
management on neighbors is that they may need to absorb additional costs to avoid 
impacts to conservation concessions but they can benefit from data generated from the 
site.  
Scenario 2: REDD+ without Offset 
The effective management of the site for conservation with zero net deforestation will 
generate emission reduction of about $84,468 annually to the State. This represents the 
largest single benefit in this scenario. Securing grant funding for concession under this 
scenario is not likely, or extremely difficult at best, as investors may not see additional 
benefits to these contributions given that forest conservation would already be 
compensated under the REDD+ arrangements. 
Management costs to the concessionaire represent the largest single cost under this 
scenario.  
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Net Present Values at a 10% discount rate under this scenario as determined through 
the analysis were as follows: Resource Owner $676,610; Resource Manager -$805,382; 
and Resource User $242,341. More details of the monetized costs and benefits under this 
scenario are presented in Appendix 7. 
 Table 4: Results of BCA at 10% discount rate for (a) Resource Owner, (b) Resource Manager, 
and (c) Resource Users for management as a conservation concession with REDD+ without 
offset. 
(a) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $          20,000   $             -     $       20,000  
1  $          90,039   $    12,842   $       77,197  
2  $       148,460   $    12,842   $     135,618  
3  $       129,890   $    14,414   $     115,476  
4  $       125,942   $    15,736   $     110,205  
5  $       137,658   $    17,444   $     120,213  
6  $       115,698   $    24,061   $       91,637  
7  $       126,964   $    26,482   $     100,482  
8  $       125,983   $    26,203   $       99,780  
9  $       126,137   $    16,384   $     109,752  
10  $       126,468   $    21,200   $     105,267  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $676,610  
 
  
~ 40 ~ 
 
(b) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $             -     $         20,000   $       (20,000) 
1  $             -     $       165,136   $     (165,136) 
2  $             -     $       110,682   $     (110,682) 
3  $             -     $       142,062   $     (142,062) 
4  $             -     $       134,039   $     (134,039) 
5  $             -     $       120,613   $     (120,613) 
6  $             -     $       132,114   $     (132,114) 
7  $             -     $       157,810   $     (157,810) 
8  $             -     $       123,124   $     (123,124) 
9  $             -     $       100,590   $     (100,590) 
10  $             -     $         85,951   $       (85,951) 
 NPV at 10% discount rate -$805,382 
  
(c) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $           -     $           -     $           -    
1  $  21,294   $           -     $  21,294  
2  $  22,415   $           -     $  22,415  
3  $  63,586   $           -     $  63,586  
4  $  57,482   $           -     $  57,482  
5  $  43,704   $           -     $  43,704  
6  $  47,332   $           -     $  47,332  
7  $  57,727   $           -     $  57,727  
8  $  36,658   $           -     $  36,658  
9  $  30,345   $           -     $  30,345  
10  $  10,314   $           -     $  10,314  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $242,341 
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Other cost and benefits under this scenario will be similar to those described for 
scenario 1. 
Scenario 3: REDD+ with Offset 
The compensation of reduced deforestation by offset payments received by the 
Resource Manager and additional royalties to the State from gold production are the 
most significant benefits under this scenario. Costs under this scenario are identical 
those under Scenario 2.  
At the 10% discount rate, NPV of this scenario is $1,463,967 to the Resource Owner, 
$809,405 to the Resource Manager, and $242,341 to Resource Users. Table 5 below 
shows the summarized results for this scenario, more details can be found in Appendix 
8. 
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 Table 5: Results of BCA at 10% discount rate for (a) Resource Owner, (b) Resource Manager, 
and (c) Resource Users for management as a conservation concession with REDD+ with offset. 
(a) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $          20,000   $           -     $        20,000  
1  $       145,459   $  12,842   $     132,617  
2  $       202,037   $  12,842   $     189,195  
3  $       163,401   $  14,414   $     148,987  
4  $       221,800   $  15,736   $     206,063  
5  $       328,451   $  17,444   $     311,007  
6  $       346,247   $  24,061   $     322,186  
7  $       494,237   $  26,482   $     467,755  
8  $       210,735   $  26,203   $     184,532  
9  $       320,559   $  16,384   $     304,174  
10  $       237,946   $  21,200   $     216,746  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $1,463,967  
 
(b) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $                   -     $         20,000   $      (20,000) 
1  $       174,860   $       165,136   $           9,724  
2  $       172,556   $       110,682   $         61,874  
3  $       147,474   $       142,062   $           5,412  
4  $       225,407   $       134,039   $         91,368  
5  $       344,076   $       120,613   $       223,463  
6  $       393,771   $       132,114   $       261,657  
7  $       564,676   $       157,810   $       406,866  
8  $       211,525   $       123,124   $         88,401  
9  $       348,612   $       100,590   $       248,022  
10  $       244,933   $         85,951   $       158,982  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $809,405  
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(c) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $           -     $           -     $           -    
1  $  21,294   $           -     $  21,294  
2  $  22,415   $           -     $  22,415  
3  $  63,586   $           -     $  63,586  
4  $  57,482   $           -     $  57,482  
5  $  43,704   $           -     $  43,704  
6  $  47,332   $           -     $  47,332  
7  $  57,727   $           -     $  57,727  
8  $  36,658   $           -     $  36,658  
9  $  30,345   $           -     $  30,345  
10  $  10,314   $           -     $  10,314  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $242,341 
 
Other costs and benefits under this scenario are similar to those under Scenario 1. 
 
Scenario 4: Sustainable Logging 
Benefit from the sale of logs is the most significant in this scenario. Some emission 
reduction is also expected under this scenario.  The most significant costs are those 
related to the management of the site by the Resource Manager.  
Values for NPV of $455,995 to the Resource Owner; $910,087 to the Resource Manager; 
and $197,783 to the Resource Users were determined under this scenario at a discount 
rate of 10%. The summarized results of the analyses under this scenario are presented in 
Table 6 below; details of monetized costs and benefits can be found in Appendix 9. 
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Table 6: Results of BCA at 10% discount rate for (a) Resource Owner, (b) Resource Manager, 
and (c) Resource Users for management as a logging concession using SFM. 
(a) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $         20,000   $            -     $       20,000  
1  $         78,790   $  17,122   $       61,667  
2  $         81,851   $  17,122   $       64,728  
3  $         80,858   $  19,218   $       61,640  
4  $         99,460   $  20,982   $       78,479  
5  $         97,968   $  23,259   $       74,709  
6  $         95,902   $  32,081   $       63,821  
7  $         95,998   $  35,309   $       60,689  
8  $       115,570   $  34,938   $       80,632  
9  $       117,616   $  21,846   $       95,771  
10  $       115,924   $  28,267   $       87,657  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $455,995  
 
(b) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0  $              -     $         20,000   $      (20,000) 
1  $ 310,643   $       229,464   $         81,179  
2  $ 481,323   $       355,001   $       126,322  
3  $ 425,957   $       340,893   $         85,064  
4  $ 556,365   $       423,427   $       132,938  
5  $ 537,784   $       405,163   $       132,621  
6  $ 549,755   $       375,958   $       173,797  
7  $ 596,121   $       370,697   $       225,424  
8  $ 662,784   $       452,168   $       210,616  
9  $ 648,284   $       417,163   $       231,121  
10  $ 695,565   $       423,791   $       271,774  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $910,087  
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(c) 
 Total Benefit Total Cost Net Benefit 
0    $            -     $           -     $                 -    
1  $  18,920   $           -     $       18,920  
2  $  30,927   $           -     $       30,927  
3  $  29,641   $           -     $       29,641  
4  $  37,571   $           -     $       37,571  
5  $  35,928   $           -     $       35,928  
6  $  33,165   $           -     $       33,165  
7  $  32,682   $           -     $       32,682  
8  $  40,551   $           -     $       40,551  
9  $  37,203   $           -     $       37,203  
10  $  37,863   $           -     $       37,863  
 NPV at 10% discount rate $197,783  
 
In addition to the benefits monetized in this analysis, it is expected that this scenario 
would provide benefits to downstream value-added operations of sawmills and 
manufacturing, and generate additional applicable royalties and taxes to the State. 
Benefits are also expected to be derived from the availability of materials for 
construction.  
Some negative impacts to biodiversity and ecosystem service are expected under this 
scenario. Studies have shown that selective logging can lead to changes in community 
composition and structure (ter Steege, Welch, & Zagt, 2002). Under sustainable forest 
management, it is expected that these impacts would however be negligible.  
Summary of Results 
A summary of the results for all the scenarios is presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Summary of results at 10% discount rate. 
 NPV 
 Resource Owner Resource Manager Resource User 
Conservation Concession $157,592  $0  $242,341 
REDD+ without offset $676,610 -$805,382 $242,341 
REDD+ with offset $1,463,967  $809,405  $242,341 
Logging $455,995  $910,087  $197,783  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Scenario 1, Conservation Concession (UECC), seems the least sensitive to changes in 
discount rate; Scenario 3, REDD+ with Offset, seems most sensitive to changes in the 
discount rate. The NPV to the Resource Manager seems most affected by changes in the 
discount rate. 
The REDD+ with offset scenario (scenario 3) is affected most by the rate used to 
calculate the offset payment and the price of gold. Scenario 4 – Sustainable logging – is 
highly affected by changes in the price of logs and fairly sensitive to the price of carbon. 
Since only one benefit, economic benefit to communities, and no costs were monetized 
for Resource Users under the scenarios, the NPV to this stakeholder group is highly 
sensitive to the level of this benefit.  
Discussion and Recommendations 
As posited by CI-Guyana (2013), the relationship between the magnitudes of inflows of 
benefits and outflows of costs to each stakeholder is the major determinant of the 
success of conservation concessions in Guyana. A generalized representation of these 
relationships for each scenario is shown in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5: Diagrammatic representation of monetized value flow at present value for (a) Scenario 
1, (b) Scenario 2, (c) Scenario 3, and (d) Scenario 4. 
(a) 
 
 (b) 
 
  (c) 
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 (d) 
 
Scenario 3, REDD+ with Offset, showed the best distribution of costs and benefits. 
Scenario 4, Sustainable Logging, also demonstrated a favorable distribution of costs and 
benefits. Scenario 4 also showed a lower net flow of value to the Resource Owners and 
Resource Users and a higher net flow of value to the Resource Manager than Scenario 3.  
The NPV of management was at least $0 for each stakeholder under all scenarios except 
Resource Managers under Scenario 2 (REDD+ without Offset). The highly negative 
NPV to Resource Managers under Scenario 2 is due to no inflows being identified. 
Viability of this scenario depends on realizing a better distribution of the benefits and 
costs to the stakeholders. This can be achieved in cases where viable conservation 
business opportunities, such as tourism and research, exist at the site. These businesses 
would need to provide benefits to the Resource Manager sufficient to cover costs borne 
by the concessionaire. Additionally, lowered payments to the Resource Owner and 
possibly the Resource User would be necessary to realize a desirable distribution. 
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Implications for the LCDS and REDD+ 
Success of Guyana’s LCDS and national REDD+ program depends on, inter alia, 
deliberate planning of deforestation to realize total deforestation within the agreed 
threshold. It is in the best interest of the State to also maximize the economic returns 
from deforesting activities by improving production efficiency – unit production per 
hectare of deforestation. The latter point has received much more attention in 
discussion than the former. Sustainable forest management is the hallmark of the 
forestry sector; and better exploration, and technologies to reduce impacts and improve 
recovery in the gold mining industry are being explored. 
Deliberate planning of deforestation will require a much more integrated approach to 
resource exploitation. Regulation of deforestation will be necessary to keep forest loss 
within agreed limits by transferring responsibility to maintain low rates of deforestation 
to concessionaires and project developers.  
The results of this analysis show that conservation concessions can play a central role in 
realizing success of the LCDS if offsets are required for activities which generate 
deforestation in excess of that allowed under regulation. Based on the analysis, with 
deforestation offsetting in place, a conservation concession the size of the UECC can 
avoid enough deforestation to enable a miner to produce an additional US$2.5 million 
worth of gold in one year at 2012 prices, all while keeping deforestation within the 
agreed threshold. Moreover, considering current under performance by the gold 
mining sector in terms of efficiency, this figure can be even larger. 
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Enabling Conservation Concessions 
Enabling conservation concessions within the context of Guyana’s LCDS framework 
requires concerted efforts to harmonize forest management and achieve greater 
integration in the manner in which resources are managed. A series of 
recommendations for achieving this are presented below. 
Firstly, overarching legislated regulation of deforestation needs to be established. By 
necessity, these regulations must apply to all forest uses and hence must sit within an 
agency with an ambit beyond single resource management, such as the EPA. These 
regulations must limit allowable deforestation for land uses, be set in a fair and 
equitable manner, and make performance a condition of leases and other 
authorizations. The net effect must be adherence to the deforestation threshold agreed 
to within the LCDS and the national REDD+ program. 
Secondly, mitigation of deforestation in excess of limits must be required. Forest users 
should be enabled and assisted to apply techniques and technologies to avoid, mitigate 
or ultimately offset any deforestation beyond the set limit for their particular use. To 
meet REDD+ reporting conditions, mitigation actions must be immediate and required 
in the reporting period within which the limit is exceeded. 
Efficiencies in offsetting can be achieved through a formal mechanism to facilitate trade 
between concessionaires with surplus deforestation allowance and those requiring 
additional allowance to remain in compliance. This market would likely encourage 
innovation and improve performance over time.  
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It would also be necessary to strengthen national capacities to monitor and verify 
performance by concessionaires. 
Thirdly, conservation concessions as described within the Forest Act of 2009 must be 
enabled as an economically self-sustaining forest use. A central aspect of a reformed 
conservation concession concept for Guyana, within the context of the LCDS, would be 
its use as deforestation offsets. The participation of conservation concessions in 
deforestation offsets, as described above, can be achieved while ensuring that the State 
retains ownership of the carbon content of concessions.  
The experience of management of the UECC and the results of this analysis both show 
that the distribution of costs and benefits of conservation concession management must 
be carefully addressed. Therefore, conditions for the management of conservation 
concessions under the Forest Act (2009) must importantly address equitable distribution 
of potential financial flow amongst the various stakeholders to enable all stakeholders 
to participate and benefit. This, together with financial inflows from deforestation 
offsets, as described above; and conservation businesses based on sustainable harvest 
and use within the concession can be the sources of financial sustainability of the 
conservation concessions in Guyana under the LCDS. 
Importantly, agreements for conservation concessions must also address guaranteed 
exclusive rights to the concession site. This will ensure that the concessionaire is able to 
properly manage deforestation within the site and avoid resource use conflicts, and 
thus better guarantee success. 
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Conclusion 
Conservation concessions can play a major role in realizing success of the LCDS by 
providing an economically viable forest use that delivers zero deforestation to ensure 
deliberate management of future deforestation. Realizing this will require legislation 
regulating deforestation by forest users, and the enabling of deforestation offset trading. 
This trade in offset can drive innovation and improved practices within the sectors that 
cause deforestation while at the same time providing a sustainable stream of benefit for 
conservation concession management. 
Enabling conservation concessions within the context of the LCDS will also require the 
establishment of management conditions and requirements that ensure optimum value 
flow amongst stakeholders; and exclusive rights of access by conservation 
concessionaires to concession sites. 
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Appendix 1 – VCIF Projects 
Years Apoteri Rewa Crash Water 
2002 - 2003 Received equipment for 
acoushi ant and mosquito 
control (swing-fog machine) 
and to support tourism 
(brushcutter). 
 
 
Rehabilitation of sheep flock 
to promote community-
based mutton production. 
 
Received equipment (Stihl 
076 chainsaw) to create a 
shorter river route from 
Rewa to Annai to reduce the 
time and energy of travel. 
Received equipment (Stihl 
076 chainsaw) to collect 
building materials to 
improve housing facilities in 
the community. 
2005-2006  Construction of Rewa Eco-
lodge. 
 
Construction of Crash Water 
Community Handicraft 
Centre. 
2009 - 2011 Support with the 
construction of a multi-
purpose benab to offer food 
and refreshment to river 
travellers passing by the 
village.  
 
Supported vegetable 
production for food security. 
 
Received one aluminium 
boat to improve 
transportation and capacity 
to respond to emergencies. 
Enhanced the hospitality 
facilities at the Eco-Lodge 
with three extra cabins and 
solar voltaic equipment. 
 
Received an aluminium boat 
and a 40hp outboard engine 
to improve river 
transportation for tourists. 
 
Supported to commence 
commercial crab oil (Carapa 
guianensis) production as 
part of enterprise 
development in the village. 
 
Support to improve potable 
water distribution to 
households in the village. 
 
Provided with motorised 
equipment to enhance 
cassava grating for the 
commercial production of 
by-products (e.g. farine). 
2012 Training in specialized small engine repair for all three communities. 
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Appendix 2 – Modeling of Log Production, Potential Costs and Revenue, and Emission Effects 
a. Annual Allowable Cut 
The annual allowable cut from the site was determined following the guidelines set out 
by the GFC1.  
Total Area Size (ha)             82,199  
Non Productive Forests + Slope and waterway buffers(ha)2             12,080  
Productive Forests/Loggable Forests (ha)             70,119  
Biodiversity Area (ha)                3,155  
Available Production Area (ha)             66,963  
Net Productive Forest (ha)             53,571  
 Cutting Cycles (years) 25 40 60 
Cutting Intensity (m3/ha)          8.33         13.33         20.00  
Total Allowable Cut (m3)   446,245     714,099  1,071,416  
Annual Allowable Cut (m3/year)      17,850       17,852       17,857  
Annual Allowable Area (ha/year)        2,143         1,339            893  
Number of blocks (per year)           21            13                9  
 
b. Estimated Annual Log Production 
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2003      6,107,009*     3,926,494   78,529,881     1,308,831   236,215  18.0%       3,223  
2004      6,107,009*     3,926,494   78,529,881     1,308,831   366,000  28.0%       4,993  
2005      6,107,009*     3,926,494   78,529,881     1,308,831   323,900  24.7%       4,419  
2006      6,107,009     3,926,494   78,529,881     1,308,831   394,000  30.1%       5,376  
2007      6,110,008     3,928,449   78,568,972     1,309,483   330,374  25.2%       4,505  
2008      5,872,152     3,773,433   75,468,658     1,257,811   275,320  21.9%       3,909  
2009      5,967,644     3,835,667   76,713,340     1,278,556   266,198  20.8%       3,718  
2010      6,036,899     3,880,802   77,616,039     1,293,601   320,091  24.7%       4,419  
2011      6,253,619     4,022,043   80,440,857     1,340,681   294,628  22.0%       3,924  
2012      5,992,148     3,851,637   77,032,738     1,283,879   277,447  21.6%       3,859  
* = Estimated 
                                                          
1
 Annual Plan of Operations Guidelines for Timber Harvesting Outline of Information Requirements 
2
 Estimated using spatial analysis 
3
 Data from Forest Sector Information Reports for 2006 to 2012 
4
 Assuming same percentage of Net Productive forest to Total Area as in UECC  
5
 Data from Forest Sector Information Reports for 2003 to 2012 
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C. Emission reduction and value estimation 
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V
a
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(U
S
$
)1
0  
2003 1684 236,215    0.0071        3,223  22.98 23.05        8,461   $     42,305  
2004 1684 366,000    0.0046        4,993  22.98 23.05        8,461   $     42,305  
2005 1684 323,900    0.0052        4,419  22.98 23.05        8,461   $     42,305  
2006 1007 394,000    0.0026        5,376  13.74 32.29      11,851   $     59,254  
2007 1007 330,374    0.0030        4,505  13.73 32.30      11,853   $     59,267  
2008 1007 275,320    0.0037        3,909  14.30 31.73      11,646   $     58,232  
2009 1007 266,198    0.0038        3,718  14.06 31.97      11,731   $     58,657  
2010 294 320,091    0.0009        4,419  4.06 41.97     15,404   $     77,018  
2011 186 294,628    0.0006        3,924  2.48 43.55      15,984   $     79,919  
2012 240 277,447    0.0009        3,859  3.34 42.69      15,668   $     78,340  
 
D. Average Royalty rate 
Category 
R
o
y
al
ty
 r
a
te
11
 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
12
 
W
ei
g
h
te
d
 r
a
te
 
Special Class  $        2.47  44%  $           1.09  
Class 1  $        1.41  34%  $           0.48  
Class 2  $        0.88  14%  $           0.12  
Class 3  $        0.53  7%  $           0.04  
Average royalty rate $/m3  $           1.73  
 
  
                                                          
6 Data from  GFC, 2011a, 2012b, 2013 
7 Data from Forest Sector Information Reports for 2003 to 2012 
8 The difference between the allowed deforestation (46.03 ha) and the estimated deforestation 
9 Estimated avoided deforestation multiplied conversion factor of 367 
10 Calculated at $5 per ton avoided emission 
11
 Source GFC. See Appendix 5 for more details 
12 Data derived from GFC, 2006 
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E. Royalty estimation 
Year 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 l
o
g
 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 f
o
rm
 
co
n
ce
ss
io
n
 (
m
3
) 
E
st
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a
te
d
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o
y
al
ty
 
($
)1
3  
2003                  3,223   $           5,571  
2004                  4,993   $           8,632  
2005                  4,419   $           7,639  
2006                  5,376   $           9,292  
2007                  4,505   $           7,788  
2008                  3,909   $           6,757  
2009                  3,718   $           6,427  
2010                  4,419   $           7,638  
2011                  3,924   $           6,784  
2012                  3,859   $           6,671  
 
F. Timber Sales Value 
Year 
E
st
im
a
te
d
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o
g
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 f
o
rm
 
co
n
ce
ss
io
n
 (
m
3
) 
A
v
er
a
g
e 
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 p
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(U
S
$
/
m
3
)1
4  
Value 
(US$) 
2003       3,223  96.39*  $   310,643  
2004       4,993  96.39*  $   481,323  
2005       4,419  96.39  $   425,957  
2006       5,376  103.5  $   556,365  
2007       4,505  119.37  $   537,784  
2008       3,909  140.65  $   549,755  
2009       3,718  160.34  $   596,121  
2010       4,419 150  $   662,784  
2011       3,924 165.2  $   648,284  
2012       3,859 180.25  $   695,565  
* = Estimated 
  
                                                          
13 Determined as the product of the estimated production from concession and the average royalty rate 
14 Data from Forest Sector Information Reports for 2006 to 2012 
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G. Management Costs 
 Rate of 
Inflation15 
Management 
Cost ($/m3) 
2003 5.0% $58.71  
2004 5.5% $61.93  
2005 8.3% $67.08  
2006 4.2% $69.89  
2007 14.1% $79.75  
2008 6.4% $84.85  
2009 3.6% $87.91  
2010 4.4% $91.77  
2011 3.3% $94.80  
2012 3.5% $98.12  
 
Appendix 3: Modeling of Offset Value 
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ha kg oz oz/ha oz US$/oz US$ US$ US$ 
2003 4,288  12,172  391,335  91.3 4,201  416.25  $   1,748,596   $174,860  $  139,888  
2004 4,288  11,478  369,025  86.1 3,961  435.60  $   1,725,561   $172,556   $ 138,045  
2005 4,288  8,329  267,801  62.5 2,875  513.00  $   1,474,738   $147,474   $ 117,979  
2006 2,658  6,406  205,951  77.5 3,567  632.00  $   2,254,070   $225,407   $ 180,326  
2007 2,658  7,412  238,305  89.7 4,127  833.75  $   3,440,765   $344,076   $ 275,261  
2008 2,658  8,131  261,435  98.4 4,527  869.75  $   3,937,708   $393,771   $ 315,017  
2009 2,658  9,326  299,836  112.8 5,192  1,087.50  $   5,646,757   $564,676   $ 451,741  
2010 9,384  9,543  306,816  32.7 1,505  1,405.50  $   2,115,251   $211,525   $ 169,220  
2011 7,340  11,293  363,097  49.5 2,277  1,531.00  $   3,486,122   $348,612   $ 278,890  
2012 13,664  13,644  438,662  32.1 1,478  1,657.50  $   2,449,326   $244,933   $ 195,946  
                                                          
15 Data provided by the Bank of Guyana 
16 Data from  GFC, 2011a, 2012b, 2013 
17 Data from GGMC 
18 Data from the World Gold Council (www.gold.org) 
19 10% of additional gold revenue 
20 8% of additional gold revenue 
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Appendix 4: Concession Regulation and Monitoring Estimation 
 Total 
Expenditure 
(G$)21 
Exchange 
Rate 
(G$/US$)22 
Total 
Expenditure 
(US$) 
Total 
Forest 
Allocation23 
Cost 
per 
hectare 
Estimated 
cost for 
Logging 
Estimated 
cost for 
Conservation 
2003 $398,510,310*  193.81  $       2,056,191  $6,695,871*   $  0.21  $17,669.36   $  13,252.02  
2004 $398,510,310  198.32  $       2,009,431  $6,695,871*   $  0.21  $17,267.54   $  12,950.66  
2005 $447,286,498  199.88  $       2,237,775  $6,695,871*   $  0.23  $19,229.76   $  14,422.32  
2006 $488,327,176  200.19  $       2,439,319  $6,695,871   $  0.26  $20,961.68   $  15,721.26  
2007 $560,220,748  202.48  $       2,766,795  $6,929,471   $  0.28  $22,974.26   $  17,230.70  
2008 $731,570,366  203.765  $       3,590,265  $6,560,584   $  0.38  $31,488.25   $  23,616.19  
2009 $820,121,473  203.925  $       4,021,682  $6,682,335   $ 0.42  $34,629.33  $  25,971.99  
2010 $834,183,348  203.465  $       4,099,886  $6,869,161   $ 0.42  $34,342.56  $  25,756.92  
2011 $553,710,000  204.085  $       2,713,134  $7,292,076   $ 0.26  $21,408.42   $ 16,056.32  
2012 $690,576,718  204.3575  $       3,379,258  $7,028,526   $ 0.34  $27,664.43   $ 20,748.32  
* = Estimated 
Appendix 5: Timber Royalty Rates24 
Timber Species Rates 
S
p
e
ci
a
l 
C
a
te
g
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ry
 
Greenheart 
G$494.41 per cubic metre 
Brown Silverballi 
Purpleheart 
Red Cedar 
Letterwood 
Bulletwood 
C
la
ss
  
I 
Crabwood 
G$282.52 per cubic metre 
Yellow Silverballi 
Itikiboroballi 
Locust 
Tatabu 
Determa 
Wamara 
Kabukalli 
Shibadan 
Tauroniro 
Manniballi 
Washiba 
Hakia 
Dalli 
Suya 
Ulu 
                                                          
21 Data from GFC Annual Reports 2005 to 2012 
22 Data from Bank of Guyana 
23 Data from Forest Sector Information Reports for 2006 to 2012 
24 Source GFC 
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Timber Species Rates 
Simarupa 
Aromata 
Mora 
Morabukea 
Hububalli 
C
la
ss
  
II
 
Baromalli 
G$176.57 per cubic metre 
Dukali 
Kereti  Silverballi 
Kurahara  Silverballi 
(Dolhypar) 
Wabaima 
Karohoro 
Baradan 
Ubudi 
Kirikaua 
Maporokon 
Monkey Pot 
Manni 
Pakuri 
Yaruru  (Yarula) 
Muniridan 
Wallaba 
C
la
ss
  
II
I 
Burada 
G$105.94 per cubic metre 
Duka 
Dukuria 
Fukadi  (Coffee mortar) 
Inyak 
Limonaballi 
Suradan 
White Cedar 
Futui 
Halchiballi 
Haiariballi 
Huruasa 
Iteballi 
Couriballi 
Kakaralli 
Kauta 
Kautaballi 
Korokororo (Crook) 
Kuyama 
Maho 
Warakaioro 
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Appendix 6: Details of Benefits and Cost for Scenario 1 
(a) Resource Owner 
 Benefit Cost 
  Concession 
and other fees 
Total Monitoring and 
Regulation 
Total 
0  $20,000   $20,000                  -    
1  $5,571   $5,571   $12,842   $12,842  
2  $63,992   $63,992   $12,842   $12,842  
3  $45,422   $45,422   $14,414   $14,414  
4  $41,474   $41,474   $15,736   $15,736  
5  $53,190   $53,190   $17,444   $17,444  
6  $31,230   $31,230   $24,061   $24,061  
7  $42,496   $42,496   $26,482   $26,482  
8  $41,515   $41,515   $26,203   $26,203  
9  $41,669   $41,669   $16,384   $16,384  
10  $42,000   $42,000   $21,200   $21,200  
 
(b) Resource Manager 
 
Benefit Cost 
  Grants Total 
Concession 
and other 
fees 
Community  
development 
and other 
projects 
Management 
Costs Total 
0  $20,000   $20,000   $20,000       $20,000  
1 $145,136  $145,136   $5,571   $4,835   $134,730  $145,136  
2 $110,682  $110,682   $63,992          -     $46,690  $110,682  
3 $142,062  $142,062   $45,422   $8,581   $88,059  $142,062  
4 $134,039  $134,039   $41,474   $25,787   $66,778  $134,039  
5 $120,613  $120,613   $53,190   $8,902   $58,521  $120,613  
6 $132,114  $132,114   $31,230   $11,062   $89,822  $132,114  
7 $157,810  $157,810   $42,496   $10,041   $105,273  $157,810  
8 $123,124  $123,124   $41,515   $10,000   $71,609  $123,124  
9 $100,590  $100,590   $41,669   $16,412   $42,509  $100,590  
10  $85,951   $85,951   $42,000   $10,000   $33,951   $85,951  
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(c) Resource User 
 
Benefits Cost 
  
Economic 
Benefits to 
Communities Total Total 
0     -    -    
1  $21,294   $21,294     -    
2 $22,415   $22,415       -    
3  $63,586   $63,586  -    
4  $57,482   $57,482   -    
5  $43,704   $43,704   -    
6  $47,332   $47,332  -    
7  $57,727   $57,727    -    
8  $36,658   $36,658  -    
9  $30,345   $30,345   -    
10  $10,314   $10,314   -    
 
Appendix 7: Details of Benefits and Cost for Scenario 2 
(a) Resource Owner 
 
Benefit Cost 
  
Concession 
and other 
fees 
Reduced 
emissions Total 
Monitoring 
and 
Regulation Total 
0  $20,000     $20,000      -    
1  $5,571   $84,468   $90,039   $12,842  $12,842  
2  $63,992   $84,468  $148,460   $12,842  $12,842  
3  $45,422   $84,468  $129,890   $14,414  $14,414  
4  $41,474   $84,468  $125,942   $15,736  $15,736  
5  $53,190   $84,468  $137,658   $17,444  $17,444  
6  $31,230   $84,468  $115,698   $24,061  $24,061  
7  $42,496   $84,468  $126,964   $26,482  $26,482  
8  $41,515   $84,468  $125,983   $26,203  $26,203  
9  $41,669   $84,468  $126,137   $16,384  $16,384  
10  $42,000   $84,468  $126,468   $21,200  $21,200  
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(b) Resource Manager 
 
Benefit Cost 
  Total 
Concession 
and other 
fees 
Community  
development 
and other 
projects 
Management 
Costs Total 
0   -     $20,000       $20,000  
1 -     $25,571   $4,835   $134,730   $165,136  
2 -     $63,992    -     $46,690   $110,682  
3  -     $45,422   $8,581   $88,059   $142,062  
4 -     $41,474   $25,787   $66,778   $134,039  
5   -     $53,190   $8,902   $58,521   $120,613  
6  -     $31,230   $11,062   $89,822   $132,114  
7   -     $42,496   $10,041   $105,273   $157,810  
8  -     $41,515   $10,000   $71,609   $123,124  
9   -     $41,669   $16,412   $42,509   $100,590  
10 -     $42,000   $10,000   $33,951   $85,951  
 
(c) Resource User 
 
Benefits Cost 
  
Economic 
Benefits to 
Communities Total Total 
0   -    -    
1  $21,294   $21,294  -    
2  $22,415   $22,415  -    
3  $63,586   $63,586  -    
4  $57,482   $57,482  -    
5  $43,704   $43,704  -    
6  $47,332   $47,332  -    
7  $57,727   $57,727  -    
8  $36,658   $36,658  -    
9  $30,345   $30,345  -    
10  $10,314   $10,314  -    
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Appendix 8: Details of Benefits and Cost for Scenario 3 
(a) Resource Owner 
 
Benefit Cost 
  
Concession 
and other 
fees 
Additional 
Gold 
Royalty Total 
Monitoring 
and 
Regulation Total 
0  $20,000     $20,000     -    
1  $5,571   $139,888   $145,459   $12,842   $12,842  
2  $63,992   $138,045   $202,037   $12,842   $12,842  
3  $45,422   $117,979   $163,401   $14,414   $14,414  
4  $41,474   $180,326   $221,800   $15,736   $15,736  
5  $53,190   $275,261   $328,451   $17,444   $17,444  
6  $31,230   $315,017   $346,247   $24,061   $24,061  
7  $42,496   $451,741   $494,237   $26,482   $26,482  
8  $41,515   $169,220   $210,735   $26,203   $26,203  
9  $41,669   $278,890   $320,559   $16,384   $16,384  
10  $42,000   $195,946   $237,946   $21,200   $21,200  
 
(b) Resource Manager 
 
Benefit Cost 
  
Offset and 
other 
investments Total 
Concession 
and other 
fees 
Community  
development 
and other 
projects 
Management 
Costs Total 
0   -     $20,000       $20,000  
1  $174,860   $174,860   $25,571   $4,835   $134,730   $165,136  
2  $172,556   $172,556   $63,992  -     $46,690   $110,682  
3  $147,474   $147,474   $45,422   $8,581   $88,059   $142,062  
4  $225,407   $225,407   $41,474   $25,787   $66,778   $134,039  
5  $344,076   $344,076   $53,190   $8,902   $58,521   $120,613  
6  $   393,771   $393,771   $31,230   $11,062   $89,822   $132,114  
7  $   564,676   $564,676   $42,496   $10,041   $105,273   $157,810  
8  $   211,525   $211,525   $41,515   $10,000   $71,609   $123,124  
9  $   348,612   $348,612   $41,669   $16,412   $42,509   $100,590  
10  $   244,933   $244,933   $42,000   $10,000   $33,951   $85,951  
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(c) Resource User 
 
Benefits Cost 
  
Economic 
Benefits to 
Communities Total Total 
0    -      -    
1  $21,294   $21,294    -    
2  $22,415   $22,415    -    
3  $63,586   $63,586     -    
4  $57,482   $57,482     -    
5  $43,704   $43,704     -    
6  $47,332   $47,332  -    
7  $57,727   $57,727  -    
8  $36,658   $36,658    -    
9  $30,345   $30,345  -    
10  $10,314   $10,314  -    
 
Appendix 9: Details of Benefits and Cost for Scenario 4 
(a) Resource Owner 
 
Benefit Cost 
  
Concession 
and other 
fees 
Timber 
Royalties 
Reduced 
emissions Total 
Monitoring 
and 
Regulation Total 
0  $20,000       $20,000     -    
1  $30,914   $5,571   $42,305   $78,790   $17,122   $17,122  
2  $30,914   $8,632   $42,305   $81,851   $17,122   $17,122  
3  $30,914   $7,639   $42,305   $80,858   $19,218   $19,218  
4  $30,914   $9,292   $59,254   $99,460   $20,982   $20,982  
5  $30,914   $7,788   $59,267   $97,968   $23,259   $23,259  
6  $30,914   $6,757   $58,232   $95,902   $32,081   $32,081  
7  $30,914   $6,427   $58,657   $95,998   $35,309   $35,309  
8  $30,914   $7,638   $77,018   $115,570   $34,938   $34,938  
9  $30,914   $6,784   $79,919   $117,616   $21,846   $21,846  
10  $30,914   $6,671   $78,340   $115,924   $28,267   $28,267  
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(b) Resource Manager 
 
Benefit Cost 
  
Timber 
Sales Total 
Concession 
and other 
fees 
Timber 
Royalties 
Community  
development 
and other 
projects 
Management 
Costs Total 
0     -     $20,000         $20,000  
1  $310,643   $310,643   $30,914   $5,571   $3,784   $189,195   $229,464  
2  $481,323   $481,323   $30,914   $8,632   $6,185   $309,270   $355,001  
3  $425,957   $425,957   $30,914   $7,639   $5,928   $296,412   $340,893  
4  $556,365   $556,365   $30,914   $9,292   $7,514   $375,707   $423,427  
5  $537,784   $537,784   $30,914   $7,788   $7,186   $359,276   $405,163  
6  $549,755   $549,755   $30,914   $6,757   $6,633   $331,654   $375,958  
7  $596,121   $596,121   $30,914   $6,427   $6,536   $326,820   $370,697  
8  $662,784   $662,784   $30,914   $7,638   $8,110   $405,506   $452,168  
9  $648,284   $648,284   $30,914   $6,784   $7,441   $372,025   $417,163  
10  $695,565   $695,565   $30,914   $6,671   $7,573   $378,634   $423,791  
 
(c) Resource User 
 
Benefits Cost 
  
Economic 
Benefits to 
Communities Total Total 
0    -    -    
1 $18,920  $18,920    -    
2  $30,927   $30,927    -    
3  $29,641   $29,641  -    
4  $37,571   $37,571  -    
5  $35,928   $35,928  -    
6  $33,165   $33,165  -    
7  $32,682   $32,682  -    
8  $40,551   $40,551  -    
9  $37,203   $37,203  -    
10  $37,863   $37,863  -    
 
